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IS “PRODUCT HOPPING” ANTI-COMPETITIVE OR FAIR 
GAME?: A LOOK AT THE SECOND AND THIRD CIRCUIT 
DECISIONS IN ACTAVIS PLC AND MYLAN 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
Alexis S. White1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical industry is composed of brand-name and generic2 
drug markets.3 Typically, generic drugs directly compete with their brand-
name counterparts and are competitively priced.4 The introduction of new 
drugs in both markets is heavily regulated in the United States. The Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) requires each proposed drug to submit a 
New Drug Application (“NDA”), a process that evaluates the drug’s safety 
and effectiveness for public consumption.5 NDA drugs, commonly called 
brand-name drugs, enjoy a period of exclusivity that prevents their generic 
equivalents from entering the market. Upon expiration of exclusivity rights, 
generic manufacturers can apply for an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(“ANDA”)6. The ANDA process allows generic drug manufacturers to 
“piggy-back” on approved NDAs.7 This expedites the testing process, al-
lowing generic drugs to enter the market more quickly. 
                                                                                                                             
 1. J.D. candidate at North Carolina Central University School of Law, Class of 2018; B.S. Biolo-
gy 2015, summa cum laude, Tuskegee University. 
 2. Generic drugs are copies of brand-name drugs, possessing the same active ingredients, dosage, 
route of administration, quality, performance characteristics and intended use. Center for Drug Evalua-
tion and Research, Understanding Generic Drugs - What Are Generic Drugs? Food and Drug Admin-
istration, 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understanding
GenericDrugs/ucm144456.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2017). 
 3. International Trade Administration, PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH SPOTLIGHT: The 
Pharmaceutical and Biotech Industries in the United States, SelectUSA, 
https://www.selectusa.gov/pharmaceutical-and-biotech-industries-united-states (last visited Mar 09, 
2017). 
 4. Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Savings From Generic Drugs Purchased at Retail 
Pharmacies, Food and Drug Administration (May 3, 2004), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080223131005/http://www.fda.gov/cder/consumerinfo/savingsfromgener
icdrugs.htm. 
 5. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2016). 
 6. Id. § 355(j). 
 7. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228, 186 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2013) (stating that generic 
manufacturers may circumvent the NDA process by demonstrating bioequivalence and pharmaceutical 
equivalence); Donald J. Birkett, Generics - Equal or Not?, 26 Australian Prescriber 85 (NPS Medi-
cineWise 2003) (adding that a generic drug is said to be pharmaceutical equivalent if it possesses the 
same amount of active substance, dosage, and route of administration as its brand-name competition; 
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The Sherman Antitrust Act (‘‘Sherman Act”), passed by Congress in 
1890, prohibits certain business activities that federal government regula-
tors deem to be anti-competitive.8 One pervasive tactic causing concern in 
the pharmaceutical industry, falling within the arena of restricted practices 
under the Sherman Act, is product hopping9. “Product hopping” is a tactic 
that drug manufacturers use to keep generic competitors out of the market.10 
Typically, it involves making insignificant modifications to existing brand-
name drug formulations, forcing generic competitors to exit the market, and 
re-enter a cumbersome regulatory process. This results in monopolizations 
by brand-name manufacturers.11 This note will review two cases, Actavis 
PLC and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, in which generic manufacturers complain 
of brand-name manufacturers “hard-switching”12 their products to obstruct 
the generic drug market. 
In New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (2015), the plaintiff 
filed for preliminary injunction, alleging that the defendants violated Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.13  The Second Circuit upheld the lower court’s 
decision to grant preliminary injunction.14 However, a recent opinion from 
the Third Circuit rejected the reasoning in New York v. Actavis. 
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v, Warner Chilcott (2016), the plaintiff 
brought an action against a manufacturer, alleging the creation of an unfair 
monopoly and the entering into an agreement under restraint trade in viola-
                                                                                                                             
bioequivalence describes the bioavailability of a generic drug compared to its brand-name competitor 
under similar experimental conditions). 
 8. Gregory J. Werden, Competition, Consumer Welfare, & the Sherman Act, 9 Sedona Conf. J. 87 
(2008) (“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”). 
 9. Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 
Colum. L. Rev. 1471, 1472–73 (2008). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Brief for FTC at 19, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott, Pub. Co., No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 21, 2012) [hereinafter FTC Mylan Brief], 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/amicus_briefs/mylan-pharmaceuticals-inc.v.warner-
chilcott-plc-et-al./151001mylanamicusbrief.pdf (discussing how taking an extra step by removing a 
brand-name drug from the market whose patent is approaching expiration while simultaneous introduc-
ing a new formulation coerces consumers; however, the popularity and success of the new formulation 
is not based on merit, but based on manufacturers artificially extending their monopoly in the market by 
impeding competition). 
 13. N.Y. ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. 
Allergan PLC v. N.Y. ex. rel. Schneiderman, 136 S. Ct. 581, 193 L. Ed. 2d 421 (2015) (discussing the 
State’s antitrust action against drug manufacturer, alleging that drug manufacturer introduced Namenda 
XR, an Alzheimer’s disease medication, at the end of the patent exclusivity period for the twice-daily 
version, Namenda IR and removed Namenda IR off the shelves in order thwart competition from gener-
ic competitors; the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a prelimi-
nary injunction, ordered manufacturer to keep Namenda IR on the shelves until generic product entry 
and the manufacturer appealed). 
 14. Id.   
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tion of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 The Third Circuit in Mylan 
found that the manufacturer’s actions did not obstruct the plaintiff from 
entering the market and thus were not anti-competitive.16 
Through the review of relevant anti-trust legislation and case law, this 
note reconciles the courts’ split decisions by creating a test that preserves 
the intent of the Sherman Act, while preserving brand-name manufacturers’ 
right to be competitive. 
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND STATE 
SUBSTITUTION LAWS 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act, an act to amend the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”), better known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.17 The Hatch-Waxman 
Act is a method of enabling competition between brand-name and generic 
pharmaceutical markets while also incentivizing the development of new 
drugs.18 The 1962 amendments to the FDCA imposed burdensome re-
quirements that made the approval process costly and lengthy.19 Moreover, 
only 15% of top-selling branded drugs with expired patents had generic 
competition before the passing of the Hatch-Waxman amendments.20 
The Hatch-Waxman amendments sought to cure these unintended conse-
quences by extending patent exclusivity,21 while also simplifying the pro-
cess for generic drugs to enter the market.22 Prior to 1984, the FDA required 
that both brand-name drug manufacturers and generic drug manufacturers 
submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”),23 which was “a long, compre-
                                                                                                                             
 15. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Warner Chilcott PLC et al., No. 15-2236, 2016 WL 5403626 
(3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2016). 
 16. Id. (explaining the generic manufacturer’s filed action against brand-name manufacturer of 
acne medication, alleging that they violated the Sherman Act by changing the formulation of their prod-
uct and marketing and selling the new formulation as the expiration date for its older formulation’s 
patent approached; the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted 
summary judgment for brand-name name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer appealed). 
 17. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1585. 
 18. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Amend-
ments), U.S. Food and Drug Administration (before Senate Committee on the Judiciary) (Aug. 1, 2003), 
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115033.htm. 
 19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (2012) (stating that ANDA requires the 
applicant to: submit full reports of investigations, showing whether the drug is safe for use and whether 
the drug is effective; provide a list of the components of the drug, a statement of the composition of the 
drug, and a full description of the method and facilities used to manufacture, process, and package the 
drugs; and submit assessments supporting claims that drug is safe and effective for use). 
 20. D Reiffen and MR Ward, Generic drug industry dynamics, TC Bureau Economics Working 
Paper No. 248,37–49 (2002); See RE Caves, Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Brookings paper on economics activity, 1-66 (1991). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2016). 
 22. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2016). 
 23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(2016). 
42 BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. X:39 
hensive, and costly testing process”24 that required filing scientific literature 
to support the safety and efficacy of a drug before market entry was al-
lowed.25 An approved brand-name drug enjoys a twenty-year patent exclu-
sivity period in the market, at the end of which one or more generic drugs 
that exhibit the same characteristics as the brand-name drug may enter the 
market at a lower price to compete with the brand-name drug.26 
The Hatch-Waxman Act introduced the ANDA27 to expedite the process 
of introducing lower cost generic drugs to the market. Under the ANDA, 
generic manufacturers can piggyback on the application of brand-name 
comparable drugs if they can demonstrate bioequivalence and pharmaceuti-
cal equivalence.28 Once approved, the generic drug receives an “AB-
rating,”29 which allows pharmacists to fill prescriptions for brand-name 
drugs with its generic doppelganger.30 
By the time Hatch-Waxman was passed, many states enacted drug substi-
tution legislation, further facilitating generic drug competition.31 Today, 
drug substitution laws are present in all fifty states32 and permit pharmacists 
to substitute subscriptions for brand-name drugs with generic drugs.33  In 
over thirty states, drug substitution laws require not only that generic drugs 
be bioequivalent34, but also pharmaceutically equivalent35 in accordance 
with FDA AB-rating standards.36 However, because AB-rating require-
ments are so stringent, the Hatch-Waxman Act and state substitution laws 
create loopholes for brand-name drug manufacturers to extend their periods 
                                                                                                                             
 24. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013). 
 25. Garth Boehm et. al., Development of the Genetic Industry in the US After the Hatch-Waxman 
Act of 1984, 3 Acta Pharaceutica Sinica, 297, 297 (2013). 
 26. New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2016). 
 28. Id. 
 29. FDA, Orange Book: Approved Drug with Therapeutic Equivalence Equations 7, 1-1400 
(2017), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm. 
 30. Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Devel-
opment Process, 54 Food and Drug L. J., 187, 190 (1999). 
 31. Alison Mason & Robert L. Steiner, Generic Substitution and Prescription Drug Prices: Eco-
nomic Effects of State Drug Product Selection Laws 1 (1985),  http://1.usa.gov/1IS44Ju. 
 32. Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1471, 1480 (2008). 
 33. Michael A. Carrier, A Real World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Di-
mension of Product Hopping, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 109, 1017 (2010). 
 34. Drugs are said to be bioequivalent when “the rate and extent of absorption” of the drugs are 
not significantly different; Kamal K Midha & Gordon McKay, Bioequivalence; Its History, Practice, 
and Future, 11 AAPS Journal 664–670, 664 (2009). 
 35. “[P]roducts are considered pharmaceutical equivalents if they contain the same active ingredi-
ent(s), are of the same dosage form, route of administration and are identical in strength or concentra-
tion”; U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Therapeutic Equivalence-Related Terms, in Approved 
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations vii (37 ed. 2004). 
 36. Id. at 8. 
Spring 2017]BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL LAW REVIEW 43 
of exclusivity.37 One way in which brand-name manufacturers extend their 
exclusivity is by product hopping; this is accomplished by making trivial 
changes to the brand-name drug in order to force its genetic equivalent back 
into the regulatory process.38 
III. PRODUCT HOPPING 
The most significant threat to brand-name drug profitability is generic 
drug entry.39 This is inevitable once a brand-name manufacturer loses its 
ability to market exclusively to the public. When generic products enter the 
market, the price of brand-name drugs drops dramatically. This incentivizes 
brand-name firms to delay the entry of generic competition for as long as 
possible.40 
Most product hopping antitrust claims allege that a brand-name drug 
manufacturer has manipulated the FDA system.41 When brand-name drug 
manufacturers are confronted with the likelihood of rivalry once a patent 
lapses or is held invalid, they can make minor changes to their endorsed 
drugs, get FDA approval for those paltry modifications, and supplant the 
old formulation with the new one.42 
Product hopping can be achieved through several methods. Manufactur-
ers can: (1) change some physical trait of the drug by switching from a cap-
sule to a tablet or serrating the capsule itself for self-controlled dosing; (2) 
change the molecular components without having any bearing on the drug’s 
activity itself; or (3) combine drugs that were once marketed individually.43 
From 1989 to 2000, for instance, only 35% of the 1,035 new drug applica-
tions approved by the FDA were for new molecular entities.44 Moreover, 
54% of all approvals were for drugs with new dosage forms, route of ad-
ministration, or were combined with another active ingredient.45 
                                                                                                                             
 37. Cheng, supra note 9, at 1494 (“Product hopping itself amounts to little more than a thinly 
disguised scheme to game the pharmaceutical industry’s regulatory system.”). 
 38. See generally M. Royall, Antitrust Scrutiny of Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping”, 28 Anti-
trust (2013). 
 39. See generally Steven Tenn and Brett W. Wendling, Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic 
Drug Industry (Oct. 2, 2012). US Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 
301,https://ssrn.com/abstract=1622220 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1622220 
 40. Michael Carrier & Steve Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV 167, 176 (2016). 
 41. Id. at 71. 
 42. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, IP & Antitrust: An Analysis of Anti-
trust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 15.3, at 74.1(Supp. 2010). (lowercase title) 
 43. Steve Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 24-25 (2009). 
 44. Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, The National Institute for Health Care 
Management Research and Educational Foundation, 7 (2002), 
http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/innovations.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2016) [Hereinafter Changing Patterns]. 
 45. Id.; Shadowen, supra note 46. 
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While these changes may seem insignificant to consumers, they present 
unwarranted challenges to generic manufacturers and ultimately obstruct 
consumers’ access to lower cost genetic drugs. This divergence between the 
interests of manufacturers and consumers occurs because prescription 
pharmaceutical markets are characterized by a “price disconnect” - a doc-
tor, rather than the consumer, decides which product will be bought, but the 
product is ultimately paid for by the consumer.46 Consequently, consumer 
choice is commandeered and true market competition is obstructed. 
Resolving issues pertaining to product hopping requires a balancing act.47 
While courts are typically hesitant to question the judgment of the legisla-
ture, they also have a duty to preserve the integrity of the market by ensur-
ing a balance between competition and innovation in these markets.48 
A. The Sherman Act 
The Sherman Act is a federal statute that prohibits certain business ac-
tivities that federal government regulators deem to be anti-competitive, and 
requires the federal government to investigate and pursue trusts.49 
Historically, parties have challenged product hopping as anticompetitive 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act50, and the judicial treatment thus far 
has hinged on the presence of consumer coercion.51  Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act focuses on single-firm monopolization of a market. Un-
der Section 2, it is a felony “to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with another person to monopolize trade.”52 
Attempted monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act has three el-
ements: “(1) the defendant engaged in predatory or exclusionary conduct; 
(2) the defendant had a specific intent to monopolize; and (3) there was a 
dangerous probability that the defendant would successfully attain monopo-
ly power.”53 A claim in a civil action for such a violation requires these 
elements plus an antitrust injury caused by the violation.54 
An antitrust injury is an injury ”attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of 
                                                                                                                             
 46. Changing Patterns, supra note 44. 
 47. Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 421 (D. Del. 2006); Walgreen 
Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 48. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 
685, 686 (2009). 
 49. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2003). 
 50. Lyneger, infra note 43, at 672; see also Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. 
Supp. 2d 146, 150 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plaintiff can recover 
only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior.”). 
 51. Cheng supra note 9, at 1473. 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 2; see also Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
 53. Taylor Pub. Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Spectrum Sports, Inc. 
v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S. Ct. 884, 891, 122 L.Ed. 247 (1993). 
 54. Pac. Express, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 959 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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the practice under scrutiny.”55 This means that the injury does not result 
from a competitor’s superiority over an inferior generic product, but stems 
from a the competitor’s successful “gaming” of the system by artificially 
extending their monopoly powers. 
Courts have held that brand-name manufacturers are under no legal duty 
to help their generic competitors; however, they must refrain from activities 
that have no basis other than to thwart competition.56 From an antitrust per-
spective, product hopping is within the class of behaviors and practices that 
the Sherman Act expressly condemns.57 
 The courts have attempted to create a workable rule to reconcile 
these undermining practices beginning with Abbott Lab. v. Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc. (2006), the first case to allege an antitrust injury on the basis of 
product hopping, and Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P. (2008) 58 
B. Framing the Rule Against Product Hopping 
Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA was the first case to squarely frame an 
antitrust claim predicated on allegations of pharmaceutical product hop-
ping.59 In Abbott Labs., Defendants Abbott and Fournier (“Defendants”) 
were accused of making insignificant modifications to the brand-name drug 
TriCor in order to sabotage the entry of its generic equivalent in the phar-
maceutical market.60 Moreover, Defendants also removed the older versions 
of TriCor off the shelves and changed the code for TriCor in the National 
Drug Date File (NDDF)61 to “obsolete,” preventing pharmacies from filling 
both brand-name and generic prescriptions for TriCor’s earlier formula-
tions.62 
The Court articulated that to violate Section 2 of Sherman Act, a monop-
olist’s conduct “must harm competitive process and thereby harm consum-
                                                                                                                             
 55. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 495 U.S. 
328 (1990). 
 56. Id. at 346; see also Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 151 
(D.D.C. 2008); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (2001) (“Judicial deference to product 
innovation...does not mean that a monopolist’s product design decisions are per se lawful.”). 
 57. See generally United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); See also Vikram 
Lyneger, Should Pharmaceutical Product Hopping Be Subject to Antitrust Scrutiny?, 7 J. Patent & 
Trademark Office Soc. 663 (2015) (discussing whether product hopping is within the realm of practices 
condemned under the Sherman Act). 
 58. Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416-17; AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146. 
 59. Carrier, supra note 43, at 192. 
 60. Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416-17. 
 61. The NDDF, now called  FDB MedKnowledge, is a private database that provides information 
about FDA-approved drugs. 2015AB UMLS FDB MedKnowledge Source Information, U.S. National 
Library of Medicine (2016), https://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/sourcereleasedocs/current/NDDF/ 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
 62. Abbott Labs, 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416. 
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ers, but harm to one or more competitors will not suffice.”63  As long as a 
manufacturer does not rob the consumer of choice, “[c]ourts should not 
condemn a product change . . . unless they are relatively confident that the 
conduct in question is anticompetitive.” 64 Moreover, the Court found that 
the “rule-of-reason” test65 should be applied, balancing the “merits of new 
product innovations against the arguable competitive obstacles such innova-
tions may erect.”66 
In Walgreen v. AstraZeneca, the plaintiffs brought an action against 
AstraZeneca, alleging that the defendant violated the Sherman Act by in-
troducing over-the-counter and prescription drug replacements for its pre-
scription heartburn drug Prilosec as Prilosec’s patent was about to expire.67 
The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for attempted mar-
ket monopolization.68 The court, relying on and distinguishing from the 
reasoning in Abbott Lab and Microsoft, found that there was no “elimi-
nat[ion] [of] consumer choice[]”69, adding that introduction of the new drug 
by AstraZeneca competed with both its own and others’ drugs.70 Extrapolat-
ing from both cases, a clear rule is articulated: a change in product design is 
per se legal, and courts will give deference to product innovation. However, 
the presumption is rebuttable if a plaintiff can articulate an anticompetitive 
injury. Upon showing an injury, the court will apply the rule-of-reason test 
to balance the benefits of innovation with the harms and obstructions those 
innovations might create in the competitive market.71 
Although in Abbott Lab and AstraZeneca the courts arrived at two differ-
ent decisions, the ‘rule-of-reason’ test was never applied in either case.72 
                                                                                                                             
 63. Abbott Labs, supra note 50, at 420 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3D 34,58 
(D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
 64. Id. at 421 (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, IP & Antitrust § 
12.1 (2006); See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 63, 287 (2d Cir. 1979) (“If a 
monopolist’s products gain acceptance in the market ... it is of no importance that a judge or jury may 
later regard them as inferior, so long as that success was not based on any form of coercion.”). 
 65.  This test was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 
U.S. 1, 61–62, 31 S.Ct. 502, 516, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911). The D.C. Circuit in the Microsoft case, 253 F.3d 
34, used this test to balance the anticompetitive harm caused by Microsoft’s design change to its website 
and its procompetitive benefit; See also Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. Mastercard Int’l, Inc., 467 F.3d 
283, 289-90 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that courts analyze most antitrust claims under the rule-of-reason 
test). 
 66. Royall, supra note 38, at 73. 
 67. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 147-48. 
 68. Id. at 148. 
 69. Id. at 151. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 
(1911); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3D 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. 
Mastercard Int’l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 289-90 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 72. In 2009, Abbott Labs agreed to pay $184M to settle its antitrust claims arising out of litigation 
with competitors Teva and Impax laboratories; See Samuel Howard, Abbott Settles TriCor Class Action 
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Moreover, these cases fail to address the “grey area” between two polar-
opposite scenarios.73 
IV. 2015 SPLIT COURT DECISIONS 
In 2015, the Second and Third Circuits rendered decisions for cases in-
volving product hopping. 
A. New York v. Actavis PLC 
In New York v. Actavis PLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit became the first appellate court to address product hop-
ping.74 This case raised a novel question of antitrust law: “under what cir-
cumstances does conduct by a monopolist to perpetuate patent exclusivity 
through successive products, commonly known as ‘product hopping,’ vio-
late the Sherman Act?”75 
The defendants manufacture the drug Namenda, a medication used to 
treat Alzheimer’s disease76. The defendants have two formulations for the 
drug, Namenda IR (IR), an immediate-release drug, and Namenda XR (XR), 
an extended-release drug.77 Both versions of Namenda are medically the 
same except that the IR version is taken twice a day while the XR version is 
only taken once a day, providing different dosing.78 More importantly, they 
have different patent expiration dates; IR’s patent was set to expire in July 
2015, while XR’s patent will expire in 2029.79  Before this action, Actavis 
maintained a monopoly on the memantine-drug market.80 
Upon expiration of IR’s patent, several generic equivalents were poised 
to enter the market. Accordingly, the defendants removed their original 
formulation form the market. Namenda XR could not be substituted for 
Generic IR formulas because those drugs were not bioequivalent, which 
resulted in this litigation. 
                                                                                                                             
for $184M, Law 360, http://www.law360.com/articles/77718/abbott-settles-tricor-class-action-for-
184m. (last visited Dec. 18, 2016). 
 73. Royall, supra note 38, at 74 (discussing how the combined holdings of Abbott Labs and Astra-
Zeneca does not address varying scenarios including a manufacturer ceasing to market prior formula-
tions but not entirely removing the formulation from the market). 
 74. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638. 
 75. Id. at 643. 
 76. Id. at 646. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 647 
 79. Id. 
 80. Memantine is an N-Methyl D-Aspartate (“NMDA”) receptor antagonist that affects the gluta-
mate pathway in the brain. Memantine-based drugs, like Namenda, partially block the brain’s NMDA 
receptor in order to prevent “over-activation” of that receptor, which can cause toxicity to neurons in the 
brain; David Olivares et al., N-Methyl D-Aspartate (NMDA) Receptor Antagonists and Memantine 
Treatment for Alzheimer’s Disease, Vascular Dementia and Parkinson’s Disease, 9 Current Alzheimer 
Research 746–758, 746-758 (2012) (noting that while there were other FDA approved drugs on the 
market to treat Alzheimer’s, such as Aricept, Exelon, and Razadyne, those drugs target different bio-
chemical pathways, therefore, non-substitutable for Namenda). 
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In September 2014, New York State filed for a preliminary injunction 
against Actavis, alleging violations of antitrust laws.81 The State alleges that 
in 2013, Actavis made a “soft switch” to the XR drug in response to IR’s 
approaching patent expiration.82 Despite its selling of both IR and XR for-
mulas and vigorous promotion of XR to doctors, patients and pharmacies, 
Actavis ceased to promote its IR formulation..83 Moreover, in 2014, the 
defendants attempted to make a hard-switch; they announced that they 
would discontinue IR and attempted to prevent medical providers from pre-
scribing IR unless it was “medically necessary.”84 
The State argued that Actavis attempted to impede the entry of generic 
IR by removing Namenda IR from the market, and thus, coerces consumers 
into purchasing XR by depriving them of choice.85 As a result, Actavis 
would maintain their monopoly over the memantine-drug market.86 
The court analyzed whether Actavis attempted to maintain their monopo-
ly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act87. Applying the rule-of-reason test 
articulated in Microsoft, 88 the court sought to extricate “conduct that de-
feats a competitor because of efficiency and consumer satisfaction”89 from 
conduct that thwarts the competition by way of “gaming” the system. 
The court found that the defendants’ introduction of Namenda XR and 
subsequent withdrawal of IR to be coercive and would “likely impede ge-
neric completion by precluding generic substitution.”90 By Actavis remov-
ing IR from the market, leaving XR as the only available drug of choice, 
Actavis is limiting consumer choice to purchase XR91. Because XR has 
patent protection, no other bioequivalent drug can compete until its patent 
expires in 202992. 
Moreover, it is likely that once generic IR is introduced, its marketability 
would be severely impaired by XR’s status as the drug of choice, ridding 
consumers of incentive to switch back.93 In this scenario, XR’s popularity is 
not generated by consumer choice but by an artificial monopolization of the 
                                                                                                                             
 81. Complaint at 1, New York v. Actavis PLC, 2014 WL 4627802 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2014) (14 
CV 7473). 
 82. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648. 
 83. Id. at 647-68. 
 84. Id. at 648 (attempting to show “medical necessity” would prove futile since both Namenda IR 
and XR were only distinguished by their dosing). 
 85. Id. at 654. 
 86. Id. at 649. 
 87. Id. at 651-60. 
 88. Microsoft, supra note 68. 
 89. Id. at 652 (quoting U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1359 (2d 
Cir. 1988)). 
 90. Id. at 654. 
 91. Id. at 654-55. 
 92. Id. at 642. 
 93. Id. at 656. 
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memantine-drug market. Additionally, the court found Actavis’ procompet-
itive defense to be “pretextual”94, reasoning that the defendants’ conduct 
“makes sense only because it eliminates competition.”95 
The court concluded that the “combination of withdrawing a successful 
drug from the market and introducing a reformulated version of that drug… 
without a legitimate business justification” violated Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act.96 
B. Mylan v. Warner Chilcott 
In Mylan v. Warner Chilcott, the plaintiff alleged that Warner Chilcott, 
the manufacturer of an unpatented acne medication, violated antitrust laws 
by engaging in a “product-hoping scheme” designed to impede generic 
competition.97 Mylan brought several claims under the Sherman Act;98 rele-
vant to this discussion is Mylan’s allegation that in anticipation of generic 
entry, the defendant executed three product switches99 and then subsequent-
ly removed their original formulation off the shelves.100 The plaintiff argued 
that “these switches,” provided “little or no therapeutic benefit to consum-
ers,” but “devastated the market for the prior versions of Doryx”. 101 
The defendant rebutted that branded drug companies were under no duty 
to assist generic drug companies by waiting to phase out older branded 
formulations until a generic substitute was available to the public,102 sug-
gesting that this type of “free riding” is “‘the antithesis of competition.’”103 
The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that this case was indistinguish-
able from New York v. Actavis, and that Warner Chilcott’s act of removing 
                                                                                                                             
 94. Id. at 658. 
 95. Id. at 659 (quoting In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Brief for FTC as Amicus Curiae at 18, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott, Pub. Co., No. 
12-3824 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2012) [hereinafter FTC Mylan Brief],  
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/amicus_briefs/mylan-pharmaceuticals-inc.v.warner-
chilcott-plc-et-al./151001mylanamicusbrief.pdf. 
 98. See Appellate Court Opinion at 8, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott,  Pub. Co., No 15-
2236 (3d Cir. Sep. 28 2016) [hereinafter Mylan Opinion], 
www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/152236p.pdf. 
 99. Id. Wilcott introduced three new variations of their existing formula, first from a capsule to a 
tablet, then from 75mg and 100mg tablets to a single 150mg dosage strength, and finally from a single-
scored version of the 150mg tablet to a dual-scored version. 
 100. Complaint, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 12-3824, 2-5 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 
2012) [hereinafter Mylan Complaint]. 
 101. Royall, supra note 38, at 74-75 (citing Mylan Complaint, at 2, 9). Doryx, an oral tetracycline, 
is used to treat a wide variety of bacterial infections, including those that cause acne. 
 102. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Warner Chilcott’s Motion to Dismiss at 16–19, 
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2012). 
 103. Id. at 24 (quoting Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376–79 
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)). 
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its branded medication off the market combined with the introduction of 
three substitute formulations violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 104 
The Court articulated that the Sherman Act “directs itself not against 
conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which 
unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.”105 Here, the court distinguished 
from Actavis, finding that the defendant had not established a monopoly 
over tetracycline-drug market,106 and holding that Mylan was not “fore-
closed” from the market. 107 The plaintiff could introduce generic Doryx at 
any time after 1985, as Doryx has been on the market for more than 20 
years with no patent protection. However, Mylan failed to begin its own 
production until 2003.108 
Mylan eventually obtained FDA approval for several of its formulations 
that would be allowed to compete against other tetracycline drugs. Thus, 
any argument that the defendant’s subsequent formulations obstructed the 
generic market failed. Ultimately, the court found that Mylan failed to state 
an anticompetitive injury.109 Reconciling other claims, the court addressed 
the second prong of the Microsoft test. The court found that even if an anti-
competitive injury was present, the defendant presented legitimate business 
justifications.110 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff’s did 
not meet its burden under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
V. RECONCILING THE SPLIT 
A. Product Shifting 
Articulated in AstraZeneca and Microsoft, courts will give deference to 
innovation.111 Perceivably frivolous changes made to an existing product 
formulation are legal per se. In both Actavis and Mylan, brand-name manu-
facturers made changes to their drug formulations related to either dosing or 
                                                                                                                             
 104. Mylan Opinion, supra note 102, at 34. 
 105. Id. at 35 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)). 
 106. Id. 28-32 (discussing how several other tetracycline drugs were on the market and Doryx’s 
market share never exceeded 18%). Tetracyline drugs are antibiotic drugs used to treat bacterial infec-
tions. Tetracyclines are used to treat various infections including acne, sexually transmitted diseases 
such as syphilis, and pneumonia. 
 107. Id. at 36. (“[Actavis] involved the defendants’ attempts to avoid a “patent cliff” – the end of 
patent exclusivity, corresponding to the brand drug’s loss of market share – by stringing together new 
periods of patent exclusivity in order to completely bar generics from entering the market. It was alleged 
that the defendants did so by introducing changes to their product to delay the expiration of their patent. 
Here, there were no patent cliffs on the horizon, and the evidence demonstrates that there were plenty of 
other competitors already in the oral tetracycline market.”). Id. at 38. 
 108. Id. at 16-17. 
 109. Id. at 37. 
 110. Id. Warner Chilcott’s formulation changes were in response to doxycycline capsules being 
linked with esophageal problems, poor shelf-life, and competitive manufacturers’ introduction of “self-
dosing” tablets. 
 111. See AstraZeneca Pharms.,534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 151; Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65. 
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switching from capsule to tablet form.112  As expressed in Berkley, courts 
do not investigate the significance of these innovations; the purview of their 
inquiry deals with whether those innovations create an injury to the compet-
itive market.113 
B. Anticompetitive Injury 
Injury to the competitor alone is not sufficient to raise an antitrust 
claim114. The injury must cause harm to the consumer by way of coer-
cion115. In both cases, generic manufacturers accused brand-name manufac-
turers of strategically timing the release of their derivative products in order 
to interfere with generic competition. In Actavis, the court held that the in-
troduction of patented Namenda XR followed by the removal of Namenda 
IR from the market in response to impending generic IR entry rose to the 
level of coercion116. Thus, the defendants’ acts were violative of the Sher-
man Act.117 Conversely, Mylan arrived at a different conclusion, finding 
that Cilcott’s introduction of three varied Doryx formulas and removal of 
its capsulated Doryx formula did not violate the Sherman Act. 118 
In arriving at the holding in these cases, both courts addressed whether 
respondent has a pre-existing monopoly or attempted to create a monopoly 
over their perspective drugs markets119. Under this analysis, Actavis is dis-
tinguished from Mylan. In Actavis, Namenda IR and XR were the only 
memantine drugs on the market120. However, in Mylan, there were several 
bioequivalent generic drugs on the market prior to Chilcott’s new formula-
tion releases121. Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Actavis had an exist-
ing monopoly and their attempts at product hopping would have likely re-
sulted in them extending that monopoly. However, in Mylan, it was unlike-
ly for Chilcott to obtain a monopoly, as their drug competed with many 
others in the market and their market share had never exceeded 18%.122 
These cases are further distinguished by the protections granted to the 
brand-name manufacturers’ subsequent formulations. In Actavis, Namenda 
XR was patent protected. In Mylan, Doryx’s new formulations were not 
patented.123  Namenda XR provided the defendant with an advantage by 
                                                                                                                             
 112. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 647-49; Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 
F.3d 421, 428-31 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 113. Berkey Photo, supra note 67. 
 114. See Mylan Pharm., 838 F.3d 421, 438. 
 115. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 654-55; Mylan Pharm., 838 F.3d 421, 441. 
 116. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 655. 
 117. Id. at 663. 
 118. Mylan Pharm., 838 F.3d 421, 441-42. 
 119. Id., at 433-38; Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 651-52. 
 120. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 652. 
 121. Mylan Pharm., 838, F. 3d 421, 437-38. 
 122. Id. at 438. 
 123. Id. at 440. 
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artificially extending Actavis’ absolute monopoly for another 15 years124. In 
Mylan, however, neither the original nor derivative formulations were pa-
tented. Doryx’s popularity in its market was merit-based while Namenda 
became a leading brand through exclusivity.125 
C. Legitimate Business Justifications 
Microsoft provided that the defendants may rebut a claim that they en-
gaged in anticompetitive practices by providing procompetitive justifica-
tions.126 Under this prong, the cases were further distinguished. In Actavis, 
the court found that the defendant’s purpose was flagrant;127 the defendants 
wanted to fend off generic competition. In Mylan, on the other hand, the 
defendant provided substantial justifications. 128 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the Second and Third Circuits have appeared to reach unequivocal 
decisions in two factually similar cases, both courts have followed the doc-
trine of stare decisis, rendering decisions consistent with the standards ar-
ticulated in of Abbott Lab and AstraZeneca129. Where the precedent cases 
remained silent,130 the Second and Third Circuits have filled in the gaps. 
Accordingly, courts should defer to the rule-of-reason test, initially weigh-
ing procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive harms, disregarding wheth-
er an intent to establish a monopoly was present. If a product on its merits 
results in a monopoly, it reflects the choices of consumers. Thus, further 
inquiry would frustrate the purpose of antitrust laws. 
                                                                                                                             
 124. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 660. 
 125. See Mylan Pharm., 838, F. 3d 421, 438-39; See Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 660-61. 
 126. Microsoft, supra note 92, at 59. 
 127. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 658 (“We need to transition volume to XR to protect our 
Namenda revenue from generic penetration in 2015 when we lose IR patent exclusivity.”). 
 128. Mylan, supra note 15, at 37. 
 129. Abbott Labs., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 421–23; AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 
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 130. Royall, supra note 38, at 74. 
